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Introduction 
The aim of this special issue is to promote discussion on the value of truth and doxastic 
axiology. A key question of doxastic axiology is how to evaluate beliefs. There are three major 
approaches to it: the deontological one, the virtue theoretical one and the consequentialist one. 
The  majority of the proponents of these approaches accepts the thesis that beliefs are primarily 
valuable because of their epistemic features. According to epistemic deontologism, certain 
epistemic norms determine whether it is permissible or not to have a certain belief (see Cohen 
1984; Pollock 1987; and Feldman 2000). According to virtue epistemology, a valuable belief 
is an achievement of the epistemic agent manifesting an epistemic virtue in forming the belief 
in question (see Zagzebski 1996 and 2003; Sosa and Bonjour 2003; Sosa 2007; Greco 2009; 
Riggs 2009; Greco and Turri 2012; Pritchard and Turri 2014; and Carter, Jarvis and Rubin 
2015). Epistemic consequentialism says that, roughly, the epistemic benefits that follow from 
having a belief determine the value of the belief or the act of forming it (see Goldman 1979 
and 1986; Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn 2014; Joyce 1998 and 2009; Greaves and Wallace 2006; 
Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010a and 2010b, and Pettigrew 2013). 
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How is the debate on doxastic axiology linked to the issue of the value of truth? 
According to a popular view, called veritism, the value of a belief is fundamentally provided 
by its truth or accuracy (see Goldman 1999; Pettigrew 2016; Pritchard 2016; and Joyce 2018). 
Although the deontological approach, the virtue theoretical approach or the consequentialist 
approach to doxastic axiology do not entail veritism, the latter is often assumed more or less 
explicitly by the advocates of these three approaches. Nevertheless, within this debate, the role 
of truth remains partly controversial, since not everyone agrees that truth is the sole or the 
primary factor that provides value to beliefs, or that truth is even necessary to explicate doxastic 
value. Some contend that the value of beliefs is primarily provided by epistemic features but 
different from truth (e.g. their constituting knowledge), or that truth is just one among other 
equally fundamental epistemic values. Others argue that the value of a belief is provided only 
by non-epistemic features, or that the value of true belief is merely instrumental. If this is 
correct, even false beliefs might be valuable. Moreover, some contend that the value of truth 
can vary across different domains of discourse. 
The contributions to this special issue on the value of truth cover four main topics. The 
first is the relation between truth and doxastic norms. A key question is the role of truth in 
determining our doxastic and epistemic norms (norms of belief, evidence, acceptance, 
testimony, etc.). The second topic is the primary units of epistemic evaluation, whether they 
are propositions or propositional attitudes as, for instance, most veritists usually assume or 
something else, such as intellectual agents. The third topic is the nature of the value of truth, 
whether truth has a fundamental or an instrumental value depending on other, possibly non-
epistemic, values. The fourth topic regards the plurality of the value of truth, whether the value 
of truth is domain-general and monistic, or domain-specific and pluralistic. In the following, 
we first elaborate on these four themes, then we summarize the main points of the contributions 
to this special issue. 
The first topic is the relation between truth and epistemic norms, i.e. the role of truth in 
grounding doxastic evaluations. Let us start with the relation between truth and normativity. A 
seemingly trivial assumption could be that truth plays a central role in determining epistemic 
norms. However, some challenge the thesis that true beliefs are always more valuable than 
those that comply with norms about evidence but are false (see Cohen 1984; Feldman 2000; 
and Wedgwood 2002). According to deontological epistemology, beliefs are evaluated on the 
basis of their conformity to certain epistemic obligations, regardless of the consequences and 
the sources of these beliefs (see Alston 1988; Vahid 1998; Nottelmann 2013; McHugh 2014; 
and Sylvan and Sosa 2018). For instance deontic evidentialism is the view that it is 
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epistemically rational for an agent to believe a proposition given her total evidence just in case 
her total evidence supports the belief (see Eder’s paper in this issue; also see Alston 1988; 
Vahid 1998; Conee and Feldman 2008; and Beddor 2015). In this case the (likely) truth of the 
belief in question does not necessarily determine whether an epistemically rational agent 
should or could believe it or not. By contrast, if epistemic rationality is understood as 
teleological and its aim is to produce true beliefs, then the norms of belief formation are 
considered appropriate when they serve that epistemic aim (see Littlejohn 2018; Wedgwood 
2018; Wrenn 2016 for criticism see Berker 2013). For instance, if truth is the central epistemic 
aim, then truth serves as the basis of epistemic normativity: epistemic norms are such that 
following them results in (likely) true beliefs. However, if the end of inquiry does not determine 
epistemic norms, epistemic norms could be explained by something else than truth––for 
instance, the constitutive role that beliefs play in our cognitive life (see Nolfi 2015, and her 
contribution to this special issue). 
The second topic is the value of truth and the nature of the units of epistemic evaluation. 
It is not obvious that truth must be a key value in epistemic evaluations. Many philosophers 
(for instance, the majority of veritists and consequentialists) agree that the basic units of 
epistemic evaluation are propositions or propositional attitudes, as they are the sort of things 
that can be true or false. However, virtue epistemologists take agents or communities to be the 
primary focus of epistemic evaluation, in which case the centrality of the value of truth becomes 
less clear (see Zagzebski 1996 and 2003; Greco 2009 and 2012; Sosa 2003 and 2007; and Riggs 
2009). A suspect is, nevertheless, that the actual relations holding between veritism and 
apparently alternative views construing epistemic value in terms of intellectual virtues have not 
been adequately explored. One may defend a form of veritism just by taking intellectual agents 
as the primary subject of evaluation (see Pritchard, in this issue). Finally, even if propositions 
or propositional attitudes are taken to be the proper units of evaluation, a value different from 
truth –– such as understanding –– can be argued to be the basic epistemic value (see Kvanvig 
2003).  
The third topic discussed in this special issue is how and why truth is valuable. It 
involves many complications. Three sub-problems can be distinguished. First, whether or not 
truth is the fundamental epistemic value. For veritists, the answer is affirmative (see Goldman 
1999 and Pettigrew 2016). As said, some disagree and argue that other things such as certain 
propositional attitudes or states of the subject –– prominently, understanding –– bear the 
fundamental epistemic value (see Kvanvig 2003; and Haddock, Millar and Pritchard 2009). 
The second sub-problem concerns the nature of the value of truth: whether this is internal (i.e. 
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it arises from the nature of truth itself) or is external (i.e. it is grounded in something else) (for 
discussion, see for example Goldman 1999; Sosa 2000, 2003 and 2004; David 2001 and 2005; 
Lynch 2004; Alston 2005; DePaul 2009; and Baehr 2012). If the value of truth is internal, it is 
truth itself that makes believing, acquiring or promoting true propositions good or desirable. If 
the value of truth is external, then this value arises from other values –– for example, the value 
of believing, acquiring or promoting propositions that foster intellectual or human flourishing 
(see Bader 2013 and Ferrari’s contribution to this special issue). Related to this question, one 
might ask in what sense, exactly, truth is valuable (e.g. practical, social, moral, etc.). This leads 
us to the third sub-problem: is the value of truth fundamentally epistemic, or is truth only 
instrumentally valuable as a means to other types of values? Some have argued that true beliefs 
lack any intrinsic epistemic value (see Gaultier 2017 and Wrenn 2017). What looks pretty 
certain is that having or achieving true beliefs has some non-epistemic value (that is, social, 
practical, moral, etc.). Purist views about the value of truth, however, holds that at least in 
certain cases or domains, having true beliefs is also intrinsically valuable and remains so even 
if having those true beliefs lacks any social, practical value (see Goldman 1999; David 2001 
and 2005; Lynch 2004; Alston 2005; and Baehr 2012). This view does not exclude that true 
beliefs typically have social and practical value, but it implies that (in some cases at least) truth 
is valuable for the sake of itself (such as, when the inquiry is motivated by mere curiosity). 
Some insist, however, that the value of truth is always instrumental (see McCormick’s 
contribution). For them, true beliefs are valuable only because they help us achieve or promote 
various practical, social, or moral goals.  
The fourth topic concerns how alethic pluralism relates to the question of the value of 
truth. Alethic pluralism is the view that, roughly, there is more than one truth property. 
Propositions in different domains (everyday, scientific, moral, aesthetics, taste) may be true in 
different ways if they are true at all (see Wright 1992 and 2001). Alethic monism, on the other 
hand, posits that all true propositions are true in the same sense. Pluralism is motivated by the 
intuition that certain theories of truth –– such as correspondence theory –– are the most 
plausible in domains of factual everyday claims as well as basic scientific claims, while in some 
other domains –– e.g. those concerning matters of taste and aesthetics –– certain forms of 
alethic anti-realism seem to be more plausible candidates. The alethic pluralist claims that truth 
is a substantive property in all areas of discourse (see Lynch 2009a and 2009b), even in those 
where we seem to be less interested in knowing the truth (for instance, those concerning matters 
of taste). This suggests that the value of truth may vary across different domains (see Ferrari’s 
contribution). 
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This special issue contains ten articles that provide important and original contributions 
to these debates. Six papers have been authored by invited speakers to the conference “The 
Value of Truth”, which took place at the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Budapest, in November 2018. These authors are Anna-Maria Eder, Filippo Ferrari, 
Tihamér Margitay, Miriam McCormick, Kate Nolfi, and Duncan Pritchard. In addition, this 
special issue contains four call-for-papers contributions by Joseph Bjelde, Jim Hutchinson, 
Tommaso Piazza, and Daniel E. Weissglass. 
The paper by Eder, Margitay, Nolfi, Piazza and Weissglass discuss relations between 
truth and doxastic norms of epistemic or non-epistemic rationality. Eder’s paper, “No 
commitment to the truth”, focuses on deontic evidentialism, according to which it is 
epistemically rational for us to believe propositions supported by our total evidence. Eder 
essentially contends that appealing to epistemic teleology to explain the normativity of 
epistemic rationality does not support the claim that we ought to believe what is rational to 
believe––it only supports the claim that we are permitted to do so. In arguing for this 
conclusion, Eder defends a special epistemic teleological position that involves no commitment 
to aiming at the truth. 
In his paper, “Epistemology of testimony and values of science”, Margitay first argues 
that the intrinsic epistemic value of testimony in science––i.e. its serving as evidence for the 
truth of what is reported––is reducible to its moral and social value––i.e. its competent, 
conscientious, and honest performance. Margitay infers from this that competence, 
conscientiousness, and honesty also count as intrinsic epistemic values in science, and that the 
norms that follow from these values have both an epistemic and social function. In light of this 
thesis, in the second part of the paper, Margitay addresses the questions of why and under what 
conditions a hearer can rationally accept a testimony in science.  
Nolfi’s paper, “Epistemic norms, all things considered”, defends a form of action-
oriented epistemology, according to which our capacity for belief is embedded within, as a 
constitutive component of, our capacity for action. Nolfi argues that her action-oriented 
epistemology provides us with a good explanation of the fact that our evaluative practice seems 
to be premised on the assumption that what we epistemically ought to believe helps to 
determine what we ought all-things-considered to believe. The paper criticises traditional 
attempts in epistemology to make sense of this phenomenon––prominently, the view that truth 
is the aim of belief-forming and, thus, the ground of normative reasons. 
Piazza’s contribution, “The value of truth and the normativity of evidence”, focuses on 
McHugh’s recent suggestion to vindicate the thesis that evidence is normative (i.e. that it 
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determines which doxastic attitude we ought to take in each case) by adducing the assumption 
that truth is epistemically valuable. Piazza argues that some of the difficulties that afflict 
McHugh’s strategy can be overcome. Yet he contends that this strategy ultimately fails because 
it commits us to acknowledging non-evidential reasons for believing. Piazza examines the 
possibility that we could have non-evidential reasons for believing because we can believe 
things on the basis of non-epistemic considerations, but he rejects the principal strategies to 
show that we can believe on non-epistemic considerations. 
In his paper, “Is belief evaluation truth sensitive? A reply to Turri”, Weissglass analyses 
the recent debate on whether the truthfulness of a proposition is or should be a relevant factor 
in our evaluation of beliefs. The most popular view on this matter –– i.e. non-factivism –– holds 
that we should judge the reasonableness of a belief independently of its truth. By contrast, 
factivism holds that our ordinary evaluations of beliefs are truth-sensitive. Recent empirical 
studies by Turri seems to support factivism. This paper argues, however, that Turri’s factivist 
conclusion is actually unsupported. 
The problem of the value of truth and the units of epistemic evaluation is explored in 
Pritchard’s and Hutchinson’s contributions. Pritchard’s paper,  “Intellectual Virtues and the 
Epistemic Value of Truth”, offers a novel defence of veritism relying on an account of 
intellectual virtues. Pritchard reviews that main objections recently raised against veritism and 
argues that they don’t actually refute the thesis that truth is the fundamental epistemic value. 
He suggests that what is problematic is, not veritism in itself, but the erroneous way in which 
it has been unpacked. Pritchard proposes an original way to account for veritism that explains 
it in terms of what an intellectually virtuous subject would value, and so in terms of an 
intellectually virtuous inquiry. 
Hutchinson’s paper, “Why can’t what is true be valuable?” focuses on an important 
feature of the recent debate on the value of truth. Hutchinson notes that the participants in this 
debate typically assume that what is alethically valuable is not the things that are true –– i.e. 
propositions –– but only certain attitudes, states or activities associated with them –– e.g. 
believing, knowing, or investigating. Hutchinson scrutinizes the five major arguments for this 
assumption, and finds all of them flawed or seriously problematic in different respects. 
Although he ultimately puts forward no argument for the thesis that it is propositions that are 
alethically valuable, the paper offers some promising starting points for such a case. 
The next two contributions –– McCormick’s and Bjelde’s –– concentrate on the 
question of how and why truth is valuable. McCormick’s article, “Value beyond truth-value: a 
practical response to skepticism”, interweaves the investigation of the value of truth with the 
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problem of responding to the sceptic. McCormick argues that the value of truth is not intrinsic 
but only instrumental: true beliefs are ultimately valuable because they contribute to both 
individual and collective flourishing. She contends that if contributing to flourishing is what 
provides truth with its value, this must count as a doxastic value, and that scepticism can be 
answered by insisting that some beliefs can be justified by appealing to this doxastic value. The 
paper answers various potential objections and contrasts this response to the sceptic with 
similar replies, such as Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory and Susanna Rinard’s “pragmatic 
skepticism”. 
Bjelde’s paper, “Anything but the truth”, argues that truth is not a fundamental 
epistemic value. The argument is two-fold. Bjelde first contends that if truth were a 
fundamental epistemic value, it should have a central role in the best explanation of certain 
epistemic evaluations. But this is not the case. For example, evaluations of beliefs as 
epistemically justified should receive their best explanation by adducing truth as an epistemic 
value. Yet these epistemic evaluations are explained at least as well by positing evidential 
support, rather than truth, as the central epistemic value. Bjelde also argues that although there 
is a set of evaluations which truth seems to best explain, according to veritists, these evaluations 
are not actually epistemic. For example, truth has been asserted to best explain why we 
generally have pro tanto reasons to desire true beliefs, but the evaluation explained is not an 
epistemic one. The paper finally analyses the assumptions of this two-fold argument in order 
to delimitate the boundaries of its effectiveness. 
Finally, Ferrari’s paper “Alethic pluralism and the value of truth” investigates whether 
and to what extent truth is valuable. It does so by isolating the value question from other 
normative issues while importing into the debate about the nature of truth some key distinctions 
from value theory. After analysing paradigmatic cases of disagreement in different fields, 
Ferrari suggests that there is significant variability in the value of truth in different areas of 
discourse. He then investigates how pluralistic accounts of the nature of truth deal with this 
variability, and finds out that it is a problem for certain popular versions of truth pluralism 
exemplified by Michael Lynch’s alethic functionalism. Ferrari proposes two ways out for 
advocates of these theories that require structural changes in them. 
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